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Many have considered Linguistics a science for decades, though linguists themselves have 
debated the accuracy of this characterization of the study of language. These conversations about 
linguistics as a science reveal a discipline intent on securing scientific status, often through 
rigorous methodology and theoretical frameworks mirroring the traditional sciences. If 
successful, however, linguistics inherits the authority of modern science, which maintains an 
epistemically hierarchical relationship with non-scientists. By examining and representing the 
epistemic relationships between expertise, authority, and science, I ask us to think of all 
linguistics not as a socially neutral endeavor, but as perpetuating the juxtaposition of scientific 
and popular understanding. To practice science responsibly, I claim, linguists must justify not 
only their own practice, but the practice of science itself through philosophical analysis and 
epistemic justification that requires us to ask: Why is my way of knowing better than theirs? 
Answering this question will help us both research responsibly and engage in productive 
conversations about the discipline’s place in the larger, often skeptical, world of academia. 
Keywords 
Philosophy of Linguistics, Epistemology, Science, Society 
Introduction 
When I submitted the abstract for the conference presentation that became this 
publication, I was wrestling with myself over two conflicting identities: the social scientist and 
language researcher, and the postmodern critic from the humanities. As a linguist who maintains 
personal and intellectual ties to postmodernity, understanding epistemological foundations of 
linguistic science is a conversation that I need to happen on both a personal and an academic 
level. This was clearly reflected in my initial abstract to the conference where these ideas were 
presented, and one of my reviewers correctly remarked that the topic I was proposing would be 
more appropriate for a workshop than for a presentation. I completely agree, and so this 
publication is not a presentation of a study and its findings, nor will I analyze any particular 
dataset. Instead, I consider this an exercise in reflexivity, in critical reflection on the discipline 
and the nature of knowledge, an informed and timely reflection on the relationships between 
experts and nonexperts on language. Nor is this discussion without its predecessors, as will be 
shown. In a time where the status of the ‘fact’ is both questioned and passionately defended in 
the American political sphere, I intend to reignite some of the conversations about the status of 
knowledge within linguistics, focusing particularly on the coveted status of science. It is my hope 
that the content of this article will be provocative enough to encourage other linguists – 
particularly those who, like me, are only recently introduced to the field – to practice some 
philosophy alongside their science. Ultimately, I advise us all to justify our own study and 
intellectual foundations in the hopes that this will help us to research responsibly, as well as 
enable us to explain the value of our work on our own terms with maximum self-awareness.  
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The paper is organized as follows: 
 First, I discuss the nature of scientific inquiry from an epistemic viewpoint, reviewing the 
pursuit of objective knowledge that is the hallmark modern science. I examine the relationships 
that are maintained or assumed in valuing scientific knowledge above others, highlighting the 
epistemic inequalities that result. In the second section, I provide a distinction between two types 
of knowledge – expertise and authority – that will hopefully prove helpful. In the third section, I 
review some of the more relevant conversations about linguistics as a science and the field’s 
relationship with the public, broadly speaking. Finally, I will wrap up by examining the 
implications of linguistics as a science and calling for a conscious effort at epistemic justification 
that goes beyond a blind appeal to scientific status.  
Science and Epistemic Authority 
In Western culture, the enterprise of scientific research holds a special epistemological 
status within society. This can be traced back as far as ancient Greece, when philosophers of 
nature first began the search for universal truths about the way the world works (see Eda & 
Cormack 2012). Working within a positivist paradigm, modern science appeals to those of us 
who are realists about or objects of study, promising knowledge wrapped safely in objectivity, 
sterile and protected from any subjective influences on its contents. Historically, Western science 
has hinged on the attainability of a ‘view from nowhere’ (Gaukroger, 2012), an ability to have 
our objects of study “passively laid-out for detached observation” (Aitchison 2001, p. 618). A 
notion of objectivity as an uncompromised analysis undertaken on an impersonal tabula rasa has 
dominated scientific study, both inductive and deductive approaches, as the epistemic certainty 
of knowledge and facts has often been the primary goal of modern science. It is no coincidence, 
then, that despite the postmodern skepticism of truths with a capital T, we continue to produce 
and teach the ‘facts’ of language and languages. Facts that, to our dismay, lack the epistemic 
authority that accompanies most established scientific practice.  
The epistemic privilege and authority of science is not only evident in the way that 
STEM fields are funded, but in the way that the relationship between scientific spheres of 
knowledge are contrasted with the public spheres. In general, there is a tendency to promote a 
‘dissemination’ approach, where knowledge is possessed by scientific experts and can (and 
should, according to dominant belief) be communicated and passed along to the layperson, the 
non-expert. According to Mogendorff (2012), who reviewed the literature investigating the 
views that scientific experts held toward their own knowledge and the roles of non-experts, 
scientists in the United Kingdom who work in the agricultural biotechnology industry “treat 
‘scientists’ and ‘laypeople’ as mutually exclusive categories,” not only dividing these spheres of 
life definitively, but restricting the possible identities for both the public and scientists 
themselves, failing “to acknowledge their own existence as both scientists and laypeople” (p. 
731). There is a history of scientists considering themselves as separate from nonexperts in an 
irreconcilable fashion. Mogendorff herself reaches a more nuanced conclusion, namely that 
“scientists present themselves as knowledge hybrids” (p. 740) who have access to both expert 
and nonexpert ways of knowing, which ascribes a particular privilege to scientists. Even the 
notion of hybridity, however, is built on concrete dissimilars, on the opposition of the scientific 
and public spheres. Although specific to the field of agricultural technology, Mogendorff’s 
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research reflects my own intuition as a scientist turned philosopher (or is it vice versa?); we, as 
scientists, uphold a dichotomous relationship between lay and expert knowledge.  
 To represent this culturally embedded juxtaposition of lay and expert knowledge, as well 
as the objective/subjective dichotomy, we can represent these relationships using Greimas’ 








Figure 1: Semiotic Square depicting the relationships between scientific and public spheres of 
knowledge. 
The semiotic square, theorized by Greimas in On Meaning, is a method of representing 
relationships between meanings, or concepts. As a structuralist model, the square is built on 
relations between concepts, and these relations are thought to have, at their core, a “definable 
logical status” (p. 48). Thus the logical relationships of contraries (S1 & S2), contradictions (S1 
& non-S1, S2 & non-S2) and implication (S1  non-S2, and S1  non-S2) are clearly 
represented in the semiotic square. The depiction in Fig. 1 is not meant to represent these 
relationships as they are, but rather as they are believed to be, according to traditional views of 
science in the West. That is, this representation clearly separates the scientific sphere from the 
public sphere and objective knowledge from subjective opinion. In Fig. 1, the relations are based 
on opposition: so science contrasts with the public, the objective with the subjective, and – 
perhaps less convincingly – knowledge with opinion. Likewise, logical contradiction is 
represented in non-S1 and non-S2. Here, that which is not-science clearly enters a relationship of 
implication with public, while that which is not-public is implied in the S1 science.  Not-
subjective and not-objective are further implications of their related Sn terms. While this square 
is presented as one complete representation, it could easily be separated into three squares.  
The benefits of having these three squares presented this way is that we are able to see 
the epistemic privileging of science over public ‘knowledge,’ which here has been labeled 
opinions. The first sublevel of the primary terms on the square represent properties believed to be 
held by these contrasting spheres of life (those of scientific study or of public concern), while the 
second sublevel may be considered a product of those spheres, so that Science is an objective 
process that produces knowledge, while the Public sphere is subjective, producing, at best, 
opinions. In this representation, then, we can see at a glance the dichotomous conceptualization 
of the relationship between scientific experts and the general public and the function of one of 
S1 S2 
Non-S1 Non-S2 
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the common justifications for this epistemic difference, that is, the degree to which the 
knowledge produced by either science or the public is thought to be objective.  
What Fig. 1 does not capture is the dynamic nature of the real-world relationships being 
described from a post-structuralist standpoint, which would place emphasis on the construction 
of knowledge and expertise through discourse and social relationships. Further, we should 
question the objective/subjective dichotomy that seems so static in the diagrams provided. The 
representation itself is not meant to be a portrayal of the relations as they are, but rather as how 
they are conceptualized by the scientists Mogendorff and others interviewed and how, I suspect, 
they are envisioned by us to some degree. A constructivist and postmodern stance on objective 
knowledge would hold that “science is one possible ode of discourse that takes place against the 
backdrop of conceptual and epistemic frameworks whose rational justification necessarily 
involves presupposing those very frameworks” (Bland 2014, p. 467). In other words, the 
knowledge that science promises is itself still infinitely contextual – it simply jumps through 
more red tape. It is probable that most academics in the social sciences don’t need to be 
reminded of the impossibility of absolute objectivity. I, myself, as Johnson (2001), “do not wish 
to suggest that linguists dispense with the notion that there are indeed ‘facts’ about language, or 
that we abandon a commitment to discovering and verifying them empirically” (p. 600), but 
merely to remind us of the fallibility of objective knowledge, which none-the-less continues to 
retain epistemic authority among scientists themselves and – to varying degrees – with the 
public.  
Expertise and Authority 
While the epistemic privilege that scientific knowledge is granted is widely recognized 
by those choosing to write on the topic, it may help us to further examine the types and degrees 
of authority that we are dealing with. Working with the discussion above, I propose a distinction 
between expertise and authority when it comes to epistemic issues.  
While scientific facts may be accorded a degree of certainty and universality, there are 
other forms of knowledge that are equally trusted at a more localized level. To describe the 
trusted knowledge of a context-dependent and specialized type, the term expertise will suffice. 
Expertise, then is an acknowledged, valued way(s) of knowing or types of knowledge that tend 
to be practical or contingently justified. Consider the skilled professions, for instance, and the 
types of knowledge and ways of knowing that are practice therein. When I have a problem with 
my car, I call the auto mechanic. If I am worried about a friend, I may talk to a mutual friend 
who has known them longer. When I grade my students’ papers, I use my expertise as an 
instructor. All forms of expertise are valuable, but contingent, or limited. Those who I consider 
to be experts others may not deem trustworthy – perhaps we can our news from different sources 
or medical advice from different types of practices. Or perhaps my expertise on language is 
respected only when among other linguists. Expertise, in this definition, is specialized.  
Authority, on the other hand, is the kind of expertise that is thought to be non-contingent 
and enjoys a widespread, social epistemic privilege. It is expertise that is ratified by others to 
such an extent that the knowledge and ways of knowing contained within it are accepted as non-
contingent fact. This type of epistemic privilege can be conceptualized as ratified expertise, and 
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it is the type typical of the natural and traditional sciences in the age of modern science, 
generally speaking.  
Scientific Status of Linguistics 
Somewhere on the syllabus of every introduction to linguistics course can be found the 
phrase, “the scientific study of language.” This description is my own go-to to explain what it is I 
study, and I suspect that, for many of us, it is not only an apt description, but a guiding principle. 
The pursuit of scientific knowledge and practice within linguistics has arisen with the discipline 
itself, arguably solidifying around the time of the cognitive turn in American linguistics. 
Nonlinguists and linguists alike, however, do not always agree on the status of linguistics as a 
science.  
The scientific status of linguistics has been repeatedly questioned by nonlinguists, who 
not only tend to resist linguistic findings and assumptions that contradict “common sense” 
(Milroy 2001, p. 620) but also seem to resist the idea of the scientific approach to language, 
doubting that “language… can be subjected to systematic, academic analysis” (Johnson 2001, p. 
598). As Milroy (2001) discusses, this resistance may be partially due to the fact that language is 
itself “internal to the common culture: it is part of it” (p. 620). As users of language, nonlinguists 
already possess beliefs and ideologies about language that are taught and then embraced with an 
almost moral certainty. The need for additional scientific inquiry seems unnecessary when faced 
with what appear to be self-evident truths about language, while the unyielding truths linguists 
produce seem only to contradict lived experience (Milroy 2001) and fail to account for “local 
contexts” (Johnson 2001). Linguistics, then, lacks authority in that the expertise that we pride 
ourselves on when it comes to language is not ratified by the public, but instead is confined to a 
narrow echo chamber of our own making. Focusing on possible solutions to poor publicization 
of linguistic research, Johnson’s (2001) contribution reminds us that the positivist, truth-seeking 
that reverberates in our ivory towers does not reflect the values and experiences of those living in 
a postmodern reality. That is, individuals treat knowledge of language as a type of expertise that, 
perhaps, cannot be ratified at all, given its contextual nature and the intricacies of its ties to non-
linguistic facets of life. Along with many other social sciences, then, linguistics has not secured a 
position of epistemic authority in the eye of the public, generally speaking.  
While nonlinguists have doubted the credibility of linguistics, linguists themselves have 
been discussing the scientific status of the field. Though linguists identify the beginnings of the 
science of language at different points (as early as grammarians, for Reichling (1947), the birth 
of comparative reconstruction, for Sapir (1929)), many have defended the scientific status of the 
field. As Hammarström (1978) characterized the issue, “American and European linguists may 
not mean the same thing when they say ‘science’ but all want to be a ‘science’” (p. 17). This 
issue, however, is debated, with disagreements over whether linguistics is rigorous enough or 
empirical enough to be considered a ‘proper’ science. Implicit in this debate has been the desire 
for scientific status. And with scientific status, traditionally, comes with epistemic privilege and 
authority. This type of authority is not only important for institutional bureaucracy, providing 
academic prestige, direction, and – last but certainly not least – funding (see Gray 1981), but also 
for those who consider science to be in-line with natural philosophy in its search for knowable 
truths about the world. That is, for many linguists, scientific study is the pathway to facts, to 
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knowledge, and to understanding. The goal of establishing linguistics as a science is not entirely 
one of authority, but of epistemic certainty.  
The desire for both epistemic certainty and uniformity, more than a ratified authority, is 
what comes through in the evidence offered up for linguistics as a science by linguists 
themselves, both before and after the discipline became formally recognized at the university 
level. Moreover, the standard against which linguistics is measured are the established sciences 
of the day, which speaks to the authority those fields enjoy even across disciplines. Sapir, in 
1929, claimed that linguistics was the best of the social sciences, due primarily to “its data and 
methods,” which he admired for being thoroughly adapted from the natural sciences, rather than 
copied from them (p. 214). While acknowledging the appropriateness of the natural sciences as a 
model of sorts for linguistics, Sapir commended linguists for taking what was effective in the 
natural sciences and modifying those approaches to fit their own objects of study. Nearly fifty 
years later, Hammarström (1978) defends linguistics by assuring fellow linguists that attempting 
to be “as objective, systematic, precise and explicit as possible” is a solid foundation for “any 
kind of scientific work” (p. 17). More recently, Clark (2006) describes the cognitive revolution 
and its axioms, claiming that they have “served to transform modern linguistics into a science 
ruled by laws as precise as those of mathematics” (p. 378). That is, scientific status may be 
bought with lawlike principles and theories, when empirical methods may be less successful. 
Nirenburg and Raskin (2004) reflect in detail upon theory-building in linguistics, also 
highlighting its importance in unifying a scientific field. The evidence offered for linguistics as a 
science, in these few examples, shows the close relationship that linguistics has with the 
traditional sciences, be they inductive or deductive. By being objective and systematic, by 
collecting and analyzing data through tried and true methods, and by arriving at the laws, 
linguistics is thought to secure its position as a science.  
Not everyone has agreed, however, that linguistics is a successful science. The state of 
the field in the 80s has been likened to the early years of physics, in that “ancient 
preconceptions” still plague the discipline, according to Yngve (1986), a particularly outspoken 
critic. Meanwhile, others have raised doubts about whether we have the theory – “what are the 
basic facts of autonomous linguistics like?” (Itkonen, 1978) – or tools necessary to be able to 
study language scientifically, given that cognition is “inaccessible to objective observation” 
(Hall, 1981). This again reveals a tendency to measure linguistics, a relatively new scientific 
enterprise, against the sciences of the day, which boast centuries of development. Gray (1981) 
has even gone so far as to argue against linguistics as a science, claiming that the future of the 
field is in danger if “above all else [linguistics] must pretend to be a science” (p. 226), a status he 
identified as primarily exclusionary, and therefore a threat to language research that 
“acknowledge its social, historical nature” (p. 225). To restrict the study of language to a science, 
Gray suggests, is to disregard valuable inquiry necessary for the development of the field. 
Though not as antagonistic as Yngve (1986), these and other scholars – linguists and 
nonlinguists alike – have expressed doubts as to the scientific status of the field. For both sides of 
the debate, retaining an interest in measuring the success of linguistics as a science against the 
positivist foundations of science that continue to hold sway in the so-called natural sciences. As 
Hall (1981) so aptly put it, “the answer [to whether or not linguistics is a science] of course 
depends on what is meant by the terms linguistics and science” (p. 221).  
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The influence of the natural sciences are not hidden, as many have acknowledged it 
outright (Sapir 1929; Hammarström 1978; Itkonen 1978; Hall 1981). Like those in the 
established fields of science and technology, linguists have reflected upon the relationship that 
their research has with society, particularly in discussions by sociolinguists regarding popular 
linguistics, or how to share linguistic research with the public. These discussions productively 
lead us to reflect on the nature of our relationship with society and how – or whether – this is a 
consequence of scientific status.  
To briefly review one such discussion, we can refer to Johnson’s (2001) “Who’s 
Misunderstanding Whom?” in the Journal of Sociolinguistics and the responses published 
therein. In this conversation, Johnson (2001) raised the issue of how we, as scientists, relate to 
the public and what can be learned from work in the ‘public understanding of science’ (PUS). 
Embracing but reflecting on our position of authority on all things language, Johnson claims that 
the deficit view – “which blamed the public for its purposed scientific illiteracy” (p. 594) – that 
has been dominant among scientists (and linguists) be questioned. She suggests that we proceed 
with self-awareness and respect for the knowledge that nonexperts have about language, 
harboring a healthy skepticism for our “belief in our duty, as linguists, to enlighten those outside 
of the discipline” (p. 601) when that belief often also “necessitate[s] a conviction as to the 
superior rationality of the knowledge we produce about language” p. (601), particularly when 
dealing with applied linguistic science. The replies to her publication did not deny the authority 
of language experts to be, in fact, experts, but generally agreed that there may even be an 
“obligation to understand and respect” nonexpert opinions (Milroy 2001, p. 625), especially 
when our own ‘facts’ are comparably mythologized (Aitchison 2001).  
Despite the emphasis on reflexivity and respect in this exchange and others, the 
traditional dichotomy of expert/nonexpert, science/nonscience remains – though perhaps less 
starkly – in the conviction that we do know better, whether that knowledge is primarily scientific 
or undeniably ideological (see Milroy 2001). Here, as in the previous insistence on linguistics as 
a science, can be seen the disparity between specialist and non-specialist knowledge about 
language.  
While this review does not cover every argument produced surrounding the discussion of 
linguistics as a science, it reveals a desire for a rigorous, reliable, and progressive discipline that 
enjoys the same epistemic reliability as the traditional sciences. Although our objects of study 
are varied even within our discipline and our methodologies and theories are equally profuse, we 
linguists are invested in the success of our discipline and repeatedly seem to pair that success 
with scientific status. It is the baggage that comes with securing a place among the sciences that I 
turn to next.  
Implications and Epistemic Justification 
 The implications of being a science are several, depending on the success (internally or 
externally measured) in achieving scientific status. From a socially-responsible epistemic point 
of view, the sort of objectivity and universality that scientific research promises is irredeemably 
elitist, founded in a position of epistemic privilege that maintains an unequal relationship 
between the public and the scientists. Practicing science traditionally means embracing this 
epistemic asymmetry, and requires us to say with complete comfort: My ways of knowing are 
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better than yours. That is, to believe in the scientific enterprise is to, at best, tolerate this 
inequality. While acknowledging the existence of ‘better’ knowledge does not preclude a 
democratic epistemology or a research based on exchange of knowledge, it requires us to be in a 
position of authority when it comes to language – a responsibility, I think, many of us are keen to 
undertake. 
What has happened with the natural or traditional sciences, however, (and which might 
explain our own interest in being similarly established) is that this epistemic authority is no 
longer questioned or justified. The authority of science is so secure that other disciplines, in 
order to develop authority, use as evidence for the superiority of their research and knowledge 
science itself. Science has been the measuring stick for epistemic authority for many a fledgling 
discipline, and those of us who practice science no longer feel any need to justify the scientific 
method or practice. The risk of authority, then, is the lack of a need to justify our ways of 
knowing, since the expertise is so widely ratified.  
Linguistics has been in the business of justifying itself, and linguists have discussed 
whether or not linguistics is a ‘proper’ science for decades. Like other social sciences, we are 
used to being made to justify our work. But what has passed for justification in the past has 
largely been an appeal to scientific status. I suggest that this, alone, is not enough. It is not 
enough to appeal to an existing authority in order to establish our own without questioning the 
source of that authority. As experts who seek authority in their objects of study – especially 
socially ratified authority – we have the responsibility to justify our ways of knowing and to do 
so with maximum self-awareness. Answering the question Why is my way of knowing better than 
theirs? is the first exercise in the philosophy of linguistics that we may complete when 
attempting to achieve the type of authority enjoyed by other sciences, or when we wish to 
diverge from the path of science itself. And our answers to this question must not simply be an 
appeal to science, but must show more awareness of the strengths and weaknesses of the 
scientific approach to knowledge.  
The type of reflexivity I’m advocating does not ensure that scientists and nonscientists 
will be epistemically equal, nor does it fix the problems that science faces when subjected to 
postmodern and constructivist criticism. Justifying science in no way guarantees a fairer, more 
democratic, or more perfect discipline. Instead, to justify our practice – science or otherwise – is 
to acknowledge these inequalities and take responsibility for them. And, occasionally, reassess 
them for their soundness. As paradigms shift and programs evolve, we may all communicate a 
little more clearly with both one another and with the public if we are willing to take our own 
knowledge production to task on a regular basis. When we are able to responsibly and self-
consciously justify our ways of knowing, we will be better prepared to bridge the gap between 
our knowledge and the rest of society. 
Conclusion 
The nature of scientific practice is not without its pitfalls, and although linguists have 
been attempting to establish the discipline as a science for decades, the authority that comes with 
scientific status is not to be taken lightly. As linguists, we should continue to be self-reflective 
and welcome critique on our own methods and practices that require us to question our epistemic 
and paradigmatic foundations. We should be open to identifying and remapping the assumptions 
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that drive our discipline, and be ready to explain the value of our work by referring to these 
assumptions, to our paradigmatic foundations, and so to our ways of knowing, whatever they 
may be. It is my hope that, by adding the need for epistemic justification to our conversations 
about linguistics as a science and linguistics and the public, we will be more willing to work with 
one another and with the public when it comes to sharing and creating knowledge about 
language.  
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